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Brunner and Leijonhufvud: friends or foes?
Pierrick Clerc
ABSTRACT
Karl Brunner and Axel Leijonhufvud constantly pointed out the prominence
of imperfect information in macroeconomic analysis. This paper argues that,
despite strong oppositions related to their rival schools of thought, this
emphasis on informational problems led them to adopt similar views on
many theoretical and methodological issues. These issues encompass the
perception of the economic agent in society, the theory of price inflexibility
and unemployment, the role of relative prices, the importance of signal-
extraction problems and the position within the Marshall-Walras divide.
KEYWORDS Keynesian–monetarist debate; Marshall–Walras divide; history of macroeconomics
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1. Introduction
In order to define the set of propositions he shared with a growing
part of monetary economists, Karl Brunner introduced 50 years ago
the term Monetarism into the mainstream vocabulary of economics.
While Friedman seemed more interested in empirical and policy-
oriented issues1, Brunner (notably during his long association with
Allan Meltzer) developed a theoretical framework devoted to formalise
the tenets of Monetarism. Furthermore, David Laidler identified
Brunner’s “stress on the importance of information and maximising
agents’ search for it” as one of the “prominent characteristics of his
particular brand of Monetarism” (2017, 11). Co-incidentally, Axel
Leijonhufvud became an internationally-known author in 1968 when
he published his On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of
Keynes. His central thesis was that the income-expenditure approach
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1 When asked to put his assertions in a broader theoretical perspective, Friedman simply chose
the IS-LM apparatus and claimed that “the basic differences among economists are empirical,
not theoretical’’ (1970, p. 234).
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(Keynesian Economics) completely missed what he saw as the true
message of Keynes (the Economics of Keynes), which would be based
on communication failures. From this perspective, Peter Howitt con-
sidered that Leijonhufvud’s book had “introduced the economics of
information into macroeconomic theory” (2002, 285) . In this paper, I
propose a “debate” between Brunner and Leijonhufvud, namely
between the monetarist and the Keynesian who pointed out the most
strongly the crucial role of imperfect information in macroeconomic
analysis. I particularly show that this emphasis led them to develop
convergent positions on the theoretical and methodological grounds,
in spite of deep differences related to their respective schools
of thought.
It is worth recalling at this stage that in the late 1960s and early
1970s, the search for micro-foundations was going on quite intensely.
Robert Gordon (1976) notably distinguished two strands in this quest.
The first one, known under the “new microeconomics” label, mainly
relates to the papers contained in the so-called “Phelps volume”
(1970). In this group of essays, “the authors are mainly concerned
with the factors which (1) make the natural unemployment rate
greater than zero, and (2) explain the negative short-run Phillips-
Curve relationship” (Gordon (1976, 205). According to Edmund
Phelps, “The theoretical departure that is common to this otherwise
neoclassical analysis is the removal of the Walrasian postulate of com-
plete information” (1969, 148). However, this volume involved and
was widely cited by authors of very different persuasions (such as
Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Thomas Sargent and, of course,
Phelps), so that there was much confusion in those years about how
the different approaches suggested did or did not fit together2. The
second one was termed “new-new microeconomics” by Gordon
(1976). The aim was “to explain price and wage contracts, and hence
sluggish price adjustment, as the result of microeconomic optimizing
behavior” (207). A central component of this strand was the implicit
contract theory3, which laid great stress on the heterogeneity in
relative risk aversion between particular categories of agents
2 The following quotations from Howitt (1984) illustrate this state of confusion: “Leijonhufvud
is able to develop Keynesian ideas using the ‘island’ approach” (432); “Leijonhufvud’s approach
shares a great deal with modern rational-expectations theory in its focus upon signal-
extraction problems” (442).
3 This theory was first developed by Costas Azariadis (1975), Martin Baily (1974) and Donald
Gordon (1974).
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(especially between employers and their employees), and was soon
considered as an important contribution to the nascent New
Keynesian literature.
The strong emphasis they put on information costs, especially along
the lines drawn by Armen Alchian (who was a contributor to the
Phelps volume), clearly placed Brunner and Leijonhufvud within the
tradition of the new microeconomics. Hence, I could have proposed a
debate between Leijonhufvud and Lucas, or between Brunner and
Phelps, or even between Phelps and Sargent… I have nevertheless
retained Brunner and Leijonhufvud for this debate, for two main rea-
sons. First and foremost, the accent laid on informational problems
was not restricted to a particular dimension of their work, or to a spe-
cific empirical fact in need of explanation. Instead, as we shall see, the
significance of these problems was pervasive throughout their writings,
whatever the issue addressed. Secondly, Brunner and Leijonhufvud
belonged to schools of thought which debated extensively during this
period, notably in public media. Their members were, and are still,
portrayed as irreducible foes. Brunner and Leijonhufvud themselves
were among the staunchest critics of their respective opponents. An
aim of the proposed debate is to show that things are much less
clear-cut.
Brunner and Leijonhufvud obviously held opposite views about
important questions. For instance, Brunner stressed time and again
that one of the main propositions of Monetarism dealt with the inher-
ent stability of the private sector of the economy: “monetarists treat
the economic system as stable. The system absorbs shocks and main-
tains stability if destabilizing policies are avoided… If such policies
are avoided, the system will continue to fluctuate in response to real
shocks, but the shock absorbing internal dynamics bound the devia-
tions and move the system toward equilibrium” (Brunner and Meltzer
(1997, 185)). This belief in the self-regulating capabilities of the mar-
ket system legitimates “laissez-faire” arrangements. Leijonhufvud,
especially in his first writings, took the opposite position. As raised by
Laidler (2006), Leijonhufvud’s “version of the Economics of Keynes
was, however, firmly based on the presumption that the experience of
the inter-war years in general, and of the United States in the 1930s
in particular, had demonstrated that market economies were inher-
ently unstable” (11, italics in original). This instability makes a strong
case for counter-cyclical policy actions.
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 3
A related issue for which Brunner and Leijonhufvud were also poles
apart concerns the ability of market mechanisms to coordinate the
allocation of resources in decentralised economies. Leijonhufvud high-
lighted throughout his writings the potential coordination failures
characterising such economies. According to Michel De Vroey,
Leijonhufvud’s main message “was that a decentralized economy faces
information and signaling problems, which make the coordination of
economic agents’ activities sub-optimal” (2016, 112). Indeed, commu-
nication failures4 between both sides of the market would prevent
market forces from succeeding in coordinating individual choices.
These failures could take place “intertemporally”, given the inability of
the interest rate to ensure the mutual consistency of saving and
investment decisions. They could also take place between the spot
markets for labour and consumption goods, “because unemployed
people without money cannot bid for consumption goods”
(Leijonhufvud (1983, 27)). This is the interaction between these two
types of communication failure, which would give rise to states with
“involuntary unemployment”, a central concept in the work of
Leijonhufvud. By contrast, Brunner perceived “market mechanisms
(as) being capable of coordinating the activities of agents” (Laidler
(1991, 639), brackets added). He was not interested by the invest-
ment-saving nexus, implicitly assuming that these decisions are con-
tinuously adjusted through interest-rate variations. Moreover, Brunner
never considered involuntary unemployment, even in his analysis of
the “stagflation” that occurred in the 1970s.
A last important question about which Brunner and Leijonhufvud
had opposite viewpoints deals with the main impulses driving busi-
ness cycles. Brunner pointed out in most of his writings the domin-
ance of monetary shocks, which would be another proposition
defining Monetarism. On the other hand, Leijonhufvud endorsed the
“real” explanation advocated by Keynes and early Keynesians, namely
that the bulk of cyclical fluctuations stems from exogenous changes in
the marginal efficiency of capital. Both authors however tempered
their positions in the 1980s, Brunner notably promoting “a
more ‘eclectic’ view of the business cycle” (Brunner and Meltzer
1997, 154).
4 These communication failures were labeled as effective demand failures by
Leijonhufvud (1973).
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In this paper, I argue that these sharp differences hide many similar
choices on the theoretical and methodological sides5. In Section 2,
I bring out the deep influence exerted by Alchian on Brunner and
Leijonhufvud (who met Alchian at the UCLA6,7) about two issues.
The first one relates to the vision of the economic agent in society,
Brunner and Leijonhufvud adhering to the evolutionary approach
put forward by Alchian. The second issue concerns the nature of
price inflexibility and unemployment. Alchian was a forerunner in
the theory of “search” unemployment, and both Brunner and
Leijonhufvud8 promoted this theory and advocated its introduction
into macroeconomic analysis. In Section 3, I stress the prominent
role that they attributed to relative prices, particularly in their
account of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to
aggregate demand. In addition, the alleged neglect of relative prices
by Keynesian economics was the main reason advanced by Brunner
and Leijonhufvud to dismiss both the income-expenditure approach
and the IS-LM model. Section 4 illustrates their emphasis on sig-
nal-extraction problems in the propagation of shocks. This is
the case for monetary impulses and the related question of the
short-run non-neutrality of money. This is also the case for real
disturbances and the persistence of unemployment associated with
stagflation. Section 5 turns to their position within the
Marshall–Walras divide. This section makes clear that Brunner and
Leijonhufvud belonged to what Leijonhufvud (1998) called the
“Classical” tradition, namely that of Alfred Marshall. They notably
shared the state-of-rest conception of equilibrium held by this
5 As an organisational device, for each issue covered in the present paper, I will systematically
begin by exposing the arguments of Brunner, then turn to that of Leijonhufvud, and conclude
by confronting them in a final paragraph (Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2 being the only exceptions).
6 In an interview with Arjo Klamer (1984), Brunner told that his encounter with colleagues at
UCLA, and most particularly with Alchian, had been even more important than his encounter
with Milton Friedman.
7 Brunner was at the UCLA from 1951 until 1966, Leijonhufvud from 1964 until the mid-1990s.
However, they did not seem to have directly met and discussed there (e.g., in faculty seminars)
between 1964 and 1966. Indeed, neither Brunner (e.g., in Klamer (1984)) nor Leijonhufvud
(e.g., in Snowdon (2004) or Jayadev and Mason (2016)) mentioned in interviews any
interaction between them. David Laidler, who had close contact with both of them, recalls that
during their overlap time at UCLA Leijonhufvud was very much Robert Clower’s protege
(email to author) and that Clower and Brunner did not get along very well. Moreover,
Brunner established his famous Konstanz seminars in 1970. Leijonhufvud attended one of
them, in the early 1980s. He also got a visiting appointment there. In both cases, Brunner
seemed to have no involvement.
8 As we shall see below, Leijonhufvud considered Alchian’s theory as a necessary condition to
involuntary unemployment.
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latter. However, they differed from most professed “Marshallians”
(such as Friedman) by coping with the “interdependence problem”9
through a general-equilibrium perspective. At the same time, they
addressed similar criticisms to Walrasian economics, and especially
to the New Classical Macroeconomics. Section 6 concludes10.
2. The influence of Armen Alchian
Alchian is considered one of the leading figures of the above-mentioned
“new microeconomics”, whose aim was to introduce informational prob-
lems into price theory in order to deal with institutional issues.
2.1. An evolutionary conception of the economic agent
Brunner and Leijonhufvud both referred to Alchian’s article entitled
“Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory” (1950). In this
important contribution, Alchian argued that the criterion of profit or
utility maximisation, usually postulated by the standard economic
analysis, applies only in case of perfect information. Alchian thus pro-
posed to go back to “a Marshallian type of analysis combined with
the essentials of Darwinian evolutionary natural selection” (213). He
stressed that realised positive profits (which, contrary to maximum
profits, represent the “pertinent requirement” (213)) could be achieved
by adaptive behavior, notably through imitation and trial-and-error
processes: “rules of behavior turns out to be codified imitations of
observed success, e.g., ‘conventional’ markup, price ‘followship’,
‘orthodox’ accounting and operating ratios, ‘proper’ advertising policy,
etc” (218). Once having recognised the necessity to escape from the
standard maximisation criterion, “most conventional economic tools
and concepts are still useful, although in a vastly different analytical
framework – one which is closely akin to the theory of biological
9 This expression is borrowed from Kevin Hoover (1984).
10 A referee of this paper raised that it would have been worthwhile to compare the positions of
Brunner and Leijonhufvud about monetary rules and regimes. Indeed, Leijonhufvud published
extensively about monetary regimes, analysing both processes of (high) inflation and
constitutional designs of monetary regimes in depth. Brunner, however, did not seem to share
the same interest about these questions. I was not able to find dedicated work on these issues
in his writings. David Laidler suggested that the important literature on central bank laws and
inflation that Robin Bade and Michael Parkin had started in the late 1970s (notably in Bade
and Parkin (1978)) could have some connections with Brunner (email to author).
Nevertheless, Parkin only recalls that Brunner had, at best, “a limited interest in this topic’’
(email to author).
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evolution. The economic counterparts of genetic heredity, mutations,
and natural selection are imitation, innovation, and positive prof-
it” (220).
This evolutionary approach was shared by Brunner and Meckling
(1977) and Brunner (1987a). Brunner and Meckling especially intro-
duced the acronym REMM, for “Resourceful, Evaluating, Maximizing
Man”, to depict their conception of man in society. According to
Brunner (1987a), “Resourcefulness, evaluating and maximizing behav-
ior possess a common basis… (for which) the individual is born with
a biological and genetic heritage” (371, brackets added). However, the
term “maximizing” should not be understood in the usual sense of
the neoclassical theory. Indeed, Brunner emphasised that “rationality
is perhaps a more basic component of the hypothesis than maximiz-
ing behavior. Limited computational facilities of computers and
human minds, the cost of gathering and interpreting information and
often a diffuse uncertainty prevent the expression of rational behavior
in terms of straightforward maximization. Rational behavior produces
instead a set of more or less conscious rules of procedure” (374)11.
Moreover, resourcefulness is such that “Man searches, probes, copes
and experiments and is not a passive entity…Resourcefulness, thus,
prepares the ground for the evolutionary analysis” (371).
The influence of Alchian’s evolutionary conception on
Leijonhufvud (1993) was most clearly expressed in a paper entitled
“Towards a Not-Too-Rational Macroeconomics”, where Leijonhufvud
described the program of computational methods in which he was
involved at UCLA. In the abstract of this article, he argued that “The
evolutionary view of Alchian should be used as a framework for the-
ory construction in the field of macroeconomics and it can be mod-
elled in a computable way”. Leijonhufvud further pointed out that
“To understand what is actually going on, I strongly believe, one must
abandon this entire mode of theory construction and rethink the mat-
ter from Alchian’s evolutionary perspective” (p. 12). The central role
he gave to adaptive behaviour even appears in the title of another
paper, namely “Adaptive Behavior, Market Processes and the
Computable Approach” (1995). Such a behaviour would imply that
11 This led Laidler (1991) to raise that “Karl’s REMM is a much more interesting and subtle
creature than the mechanically maximizing homunculus oeconomicus of the
intermediate microeconomics textbook, who is currently coming to dominate
macroeconomics, too’’ (p. 636, italics in original).
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agents “do not pick optimal points ex-ante from given opportunity
sets. Instead, they obey simple feedback-based decision rules in less
than completely known environments” (Leijonhufvud (1993, 9, italics
in original)).
Brunner and Leijonhufvud thus shared the evolutionary vision of
the economic agent suggested by Alchian. This agent operates under
incomplete information. In such a context, the usual maximisation
criterion is no longer relevant. His behavior is adaptive and manifests
itself notably through the adoption of simple rules of thumb.
2.2. Price inflexibility and unemployment
Alchian exposed his theory of price inflexibility and unemployment of
resources in the various editions of his book with William Allen and
in Alchian (1969). Concerning the labour market, he argued that the
theory of his time took unemployment as resulting from the inability
of wages to adjust to shocks. Wage rigidities, in turn, were set in an
ad-hoc manner, through union monopolies, minimum wage laws or
even “conventions and taboos” (p. 109). Alchian, instead, aimed at
truly finding an explanation of wage inflexibility and unemployment,
namely one which would be consistent with individual rationality
(p. 109).
His story starts by assuming that gathering information about jobs
involves some costs, which are smaller when workers are unemployed.
Moreover, “Changes in aggregate demand confuse the public. Each
seller notices a changed demand for his current product, but he can-
not tell if that is a change also in aggregate demand, which affects
options elsewhere” (p. 121). Hence, when faced with a cut in his
wage, a worker can fail to perceive that it is actually the equilibrium
market wage, which has fallen. It is, therefore, rational for this worker
to refuse the reduction in his wage (thus preventing wage adjustment)
and to become unemployed in order to search for a better alternative:
the rise in unemployment stems from a “lag of discernment” (p. 122)
on the side of workers, i.e., from a signal-extraction problem. All this
clearly anticipates “search” theory popularised by Diamond,
Mortensen, and Pissarides.
Alchian stressed that this analysis could more generally apply to
various types of resources and could thus explain price inflexibility
and unemployment of “nonhuman goods as well as human services”
8 P. CLERC
(p. 109). The seller of a particular asset is rewarded the selling price
minus his search cost, while the buyer pays the selling price plus his
search cost. Besides, a perfectly “liquid” asset is defined as one for
which the maximum price that a seller can expect is reached instantly,
with no search cost (p. 112).
Brunner shared the same diagnostic as Alchian about the inability
of the received price theory to explain price inflexibility and
unemployment12. According to him, this inability resulted from the
full information assumption underlying this theory. He thus proposed
to introduce information costs into price theory through the lens of
the recent (at that time) approach suggested by the “new micro-
economics”. He notably referred to the book of Alchian and Allen in
Brunner (1970, 4) and to the Phelps volume (1970) in which Alchian
(1969) was reprinted (Brunner (1971, 26)). The following sentence
brings out that it is the procedure advocated by Alchian to introduce
information costs that Brunner had in mind: “the relevant costs for
the buyer include both price and the marginal cost of information
and adjustment. Similarly, for the seller information and adjustment
costs must be subtracted from the market price in order to obtain the
relevant net market return” (p. 21).
The implications drawn are the same as Alchian: price inflexibility
and the unemployment of resources are consistent with individual
rationality. In Brunner’s words: “Relative short-run price inflexibility
thus emerges as a rational consequence of wealth-maximizing behav-
ior in the context of incomplete market information” (p. 21) and “We
obtain in this manner a price theory… (which) explains, in particu-
lar, the occurrence of unused resources as a consequence of wealth-
maximizing behavior” (Brunner (1970, 4), brackets added). Moreover,
it is worth noting that in his interview with Klamer (1984), Brunner
seems to suggest that Alchian’s theory of unemployment and price
inflexibility was developed in close connection with Brunner himself:
“These discussions (with Alchian, about unemployment) are clearly
reflected in the first edition of Alchian’s textbook” (p. 183, brack-
ets added).
Leijonhufvud largely referred to the theory of price inflexibility and
unemployment developed by Alchian in order to explain Keynes’s
12 “Such phenomena remained essentially unintelligible, unless one contrived to introduce
arbitrary constraints justified by theoretically extraneous ‘social conventions’’’ (Brunner
(1971, 31)).
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concept of “involuntary unemployment”. This is particularly true in
his 1968 book, where the analysis led in Chapter 2 (from page 76 to
page 81) relies heavily upon Alchian’s theory. This was obviously
acknowledged by Leijonhufvud: “Here the analysis paraphrases the
article by Alchian quoted above” (p. 78, fn.24). The article to which
the reference is made is Alchian (1969), but when Leijonhufvud’s
book was published, it was still not the case for the article by Alchian,
article whose title was a bit different from the one finally chosen:
“The opportunity to read an unpublished article by Professor Alchian,
‘Unemployment and the Cost of information’, is gratefully acknowl-
edged” (Leijonhufvud (1968, 69), fn.3).
Nevertheless, Leijonhufvud argued that “Alchian’s analysis remains
perfectly applicable to the explanation of individual behavior in a state
of ‘involuntary’ unemployment, and the initial ‘inflexibility’ of reserva-
tion prices that his analysis implies is, indeed, a necessary condition
for the emergence of such a state. But it is not sufficient” (p. 81).
According to Leijonhufvud, “Keynes’ involuntary unemployment is
fundamentally a product of the cumulative process, which he assumed
the initial increase of unemployment would trigger”. Leijonhufvud
termed “multiplier” this cumulative process, which he related to the
“dual-decision” hypothesis built by Robert Clower (1965). The work-
ers who become unemployed (along the lines of Alchian’s theory) fail
to realise desired sales of labour and thus find their consumption
demand income-constrained. The resulting fall in consumption expen-
ditures leads firms to reduce their labour demand further, generating
more unemployed workers who, in turn, cut their expenditures, and
so on.
Leijonhufvud (1969) acknowledged, however, that permanent
income or life-cycle approaches of consumption, which link consump-
tion to wealth rather than to current income receipts, do not imply
that unemployed workers should cut their expenditures. A deviation-
amplifying process, and then a state of involuntary unemployment,
cannot develop with such approaches. To reconcile these latter with
the multiplier, Leijonhufvud relied again on Alchian’s theory.
However, he no longer applied this theory only to labour. Instead, he
extended it to all the assets that comprise the net wealth of workers.
Most of these assets, exactly as labour, are illiquid in the sense that
some time and search are required to sell them at the maximum
price. Consequently, “We may thus envisage an individual who, while
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he regards his ‘wealth’ as in itself justifying a maintenance of accus-
tomed living standards, finds that no component of his net worth can
be realised at a market price that meets the reservation price he puts
on it. He finds himself ‘locked in’, in effect, with the balance sheet he
has. Only in this way, we can rationalise the behaviour of consumers
who let current income receipts be the operative constraint on their
consumption. The multiplier emerges from this analysis as an illiquid-
ity phenomenon” (p. 44, italics in original).
To summarise, Brunner and Leijonhufvud referred extensively to
the theory of price inflexibility and search unemployment of Alchian.
Brunner endorsed this theory to describe the unemployment of labour
as well as non-labour assets. Leijonhufvud used this theory in the
explanation of involuntary unemployment. Hence, both Brunner
and Leijonhufvud contributed to the introduction of Alchian’s
approach of price inflexibility and unemployment into the
macroeconomic analysis.
3. The central role of relative prices
3.1. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy considered by
Brunner and Meltzer, throughout their writings, relies on the relative
behavior of two prices. On the one hand, the price of existing real
assets, denoted by P, which is actually the price of existing real capital.
On the other hand, the price of output, denoted by p, which is the
price of the item that is used both for building new real capital and
for consumption purposes. Brunner and Meltzer postulated higher
costs of acquiring information for the output market than for the
assets market13. This implies that the price of output adjusts only
sluggishly to monetary shocks, while the price of assets adjusts
instantaneously: an acceleration in the monetary base thus induces an
increase in the ratio of P to p. This means that the price of new cap-
ital has fallen relative to the price of existing capital, stimulating
investment (i.e., the production of new capital). Furthermore, the
increase in the P to p ratio also generates a positive wealth effect and
then a rise in consumption. Consumer expenditures, therefore, rise
directly, “affected with equal speed as investment expenditures” and
13 Notably in Brunner (1970, 4–5 and 1971, 32–33) and Brunner and Meltzer (1972a, 954–955).
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not “delayed by the prior operation of a multiplier mechanism set
in motion by earlier changes of investment expenditures” (Brunner
(1971, 54)).
Brunner acknowledged on various occasions that this mechanism
was basically the same as the one exposed by Keynes in the Treatise
on Money and in the General Theory. Especially, in Brunner (1970):
“The monetarist analysis… exploits on the other hand suggestions
from Keynes, Wicksell, and Fisher. Keynes argued essentially in the
context of a relative price process. For simplicity, he identified bonds
and real capital. This meant that every change of the interest rate
necessarily involved a change in the relative price of existing real cap-
ital relative to consumables (or output). A change in interest rates was
then equivalent in Keynes’ analysis to a change in the relative price of
existing real capital. This relative price change either lowered the rela-
tive market price of newly produced capital goods or lowered the
marginal cost of new production relative to its market price governed
by the price on existing real capital” (p. 3, brackets in original).
Leijonhufvud stressed that one of the main aims of his 1968 book
was to demonstrate that relative prices play a crucial role in Keynes’s
theory: “It will be argued here that not only the interest rate but rela-
tive prices generally, play a more important role in Keynes’ thought
than they have usually been accorded. The price-theoretical content of
the General Theory appears to have been generally underestimated”
(Leijonhufvud (1968, 15), italics in original). This role concerns the
emergence of unemployment and its potential cure through automatic
price adjustments: “the ‘trouble’ arises from inappropriately low prices
of augmentable non-money assets relative to both wages and con-
sumer goods prices. Relative values are wrong. Consequently, balanced
deflation (as implied by the Pigou argument) will not correct the sit-
uation” (p. 46, brackets and italics in original). The importance of
relative prices also deals with the transmission mechanism of monet-
ary policy. Indeed, Leijonhufvud devoted the main part of Chapters 3
and 4 of his book to the impact of monetary policy on investment
and consumption, respectively. He argued that in the Economics of
Keynes, the transmission of monetary policy to aggregate demand
operates through relative-price movements.
As indicated in the previous quotation, Leijonhufvud considered
that two relative prices are critical in Keynes’s theory: first, the
ratio of the demand price of real capital, i.e., P, to its supply
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price, i.e., the nominal wage w; second, the ratio of P to the price
level, i.e., p. Informational problems (in relation with Alchian’s theory
of price inflexibility) entail that p and w are relatively sticky. At the
same time, Leijonhufvud pointed out that Keynes, in the Treatise on
Money as well as in the General Theory, lumped real capital with
long-maturity bonds. This induces P to be highly sensitive to varia-
tions in the long-run interest rate. Hence, when an expansion in the
monetary base occurs, the resulting decline in the long-run interest
rate implies a large increase in P relative to p and w. Therefore, an
expansionary monetary policy generates an increase in both P to w
and P to p ratios. A rise in investment is associated with the increase
in the first ratio. Simultaneously, the increase in the P to p ratio pro-
duces a positive wealth (or “windfall”) effect which raises consump-
tion. Leijonhufvud emphasised that this increase in consumption
directly results from relative-price movements and is thus not simply
induced by a previously raised income (p. 328).
Brunner and Leijonhufvud both described the transmission process
of monetary policy to aggregate demand as operating through rela-
tive-price variations. For Brunner, consumption and investment posi-
tively depend on the P to p ratio. For Leijonhufvud, consumption also
depends on this ratio while investment is positively related to the P to
w one. For both of them, the fluctuations in consumption are direct
and not the result of variations in income. Relative-price movements
occur since informational problems prevent p and w from adjusting
as rapidly as P to monetary impulses. Interestingly, Leijonhufvud
(2000) noted the similarity between the transmission mechanism in
the Economics of Keynes and the one advocated by Brunner and
Meltzer: “Brunner advanced the concept of the interest rate as
expressing the relationship between the (often implicit) rental value
and the market value of all types of assets, real as well as financial. A
decline in the interest rate, for instance, raises the demand price of an
income stream relative to its rental. (This had basically been Keynes’s
concept also)” (p. 129, brackets in original).
3.2. The dismissal of Keynesian economics
Brunner was eager to stress that the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy he proposed with Meltzer was very different from the one
contained in the income-expenditure approach developed by early
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Keynesians. In this approach, relative prices are of limited
importance: “The Keynesian reinterpretation of Keynes discarded,
however, price theory. It also developed a macro theory as an inde-
pendent field partly conflicting with relative price theory” (Brunner
(1971, 31)). This happens since “According to this analysis, real cap-
ital inherited from the past is frozen into the portfolios of individual
agents’ wealth positions. It exists and decays beyond any portfolio
adjustments proceeding on the market. No asset price P can emerge
under the circumstances and relative variations of P and p cannot
guide investment or consumption” (Brunner (1974, 32)).
Brunner asserted time and again14 that the income-expenditure
approach promoted a borrowing cost interpretation of the interest
rate, for which “The role of interest rates as the relative price of future
consumption is neglected” (Brunner and Meltzer (1972b, 843)).
Moreover, “The borrowing cost interpretation… narrowed the chan-
nel transmitting monetary impulses to a small range of expenditure
categories. It was thus frequently concluded… that the interest elasti-
city of aggregate demand is negligible… The Keynesian view thus
implied that monetary policy was unreliable”. (Brunner (1971, p. 46)).
Ironically, Brunner and Meltzer (1972b) claimed that Friedman’s
(1970, 1971) adoption of the income-expenditure framework to sum-
marise his views had led him to accept this interpretation of interest
rates and then to drop the importance of relative-price movements15.
Brunner (1970) pointed out that the transmission process of monetary
policy he put forward with Meltzer, which crucially rests on relative-
price variations, should lead to rejecting the IS-LM model. Indeed, “The
relative price process… introduced substitution and wealth adjustment
channels which… occur as shifts of the IS and LM curves” (p. 4). This
means that monetary impulses entail some shifts in the IS schedule
which do not occur in standard analyses led with IS-LM. These shifts
have two implications. First, they sharply dampen the role of the elastic-
ities of the IS and LM schedules in the transmission of monetary policy:
“In the context of the Keynesian analysis, the transmission of monetary
impulses was essentially governed by the slopes of the two curves in the
paradigmatic IS-LM apparatus… The relative price approach radically
14 See notably Brunner (1970, 1971) and Brunner and Meltzer (1997).
15 “Friedman avoids developing an alternative to the Keynesian analysis of the ‘transmission
mechanism’ with its emphasis on borrowing costs. Equally important and related…
Friedman avoids any explicit role for relative price changes and the application of price
theory to aggregative analysis’’ (p. 843).
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changed the outline of the transmission process. The slopes of the two
curves in the IS-LM diagram are not sufficient to summarize the relevant
information”. Secondly, they transform the whole IS-LM apparatus into
a cumbersome and irrelevant framework: “The heavy emphasis on the
shift properties of the IS-LM curves reflecting the substitution processes
and the wealth adjustments set in motion by a monetary impulse con-
verts the traditional IS-LM diagram into a rather inconvenient
description” (p. 5).
Leijonhufvud (1967, 404–405) emphasised that “Relative prices are,
indeed, allowed little play” in what he termed Keynesian Economics,
i.e. the income-expenditure approach. This stems from the
“aggregative structure” retained by this approach, which lumps
together consumer and capital goods. As a result, “The price of capital
goods in terms of consumer goods is fixed” (p. 404). He concluded
that Keynesian economics involves “a theory in which neither relative
values nor monetary phenomena are ‘important’” (p. 402). In a nut-
shell: “Keynes’ successors immediately reverted to an algebraic model
devoid of relative prices and with only a single commodity aggregate
– a model which showed no trace of the analytical problem that
Keynes had wrestled with for a decade” (Leijonhufvud (1968, 24)).
According to Leijonhufvud, early Keynesians perceived interests rates
as borrowing costs, leading them to downplay the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy: “In the income-expenditure literature, therefore, the general
case against reliance on monetary policy was based on the postulate of a
very low interest-elasticity of investment. The decisive impetus to this
latter thesis came from the famous Oxford Surveys, which seemed to
indicate that variations in borrowing costs had very little influence on
the investment plans of businessmen” (p. 158–159). Leijonhufvud (2000)
further recalled that Friedman, after having initially raised the import-
ance of relative-price movements in the transmission process of monet-
ary policy16, had subsequently neglected their role when he had used the
income-expenditure approach to express his positions: “The relative
price mechanism, therefore, is fading out of the picture” (p. 130).
Within the IS-LM model, the standard practice to analyse the con-
sequences of a particular disturbance consists in shifting one curve
while holding the other constant. Leijonhufvud (1980b) argued that
such practice implicitly assumes that agents have incomplete
16 Notably in Friedman and Schwartz (1963b).
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information about the shock which shifts the curve: “Once the
sequence is spelled out in this way, it is obvious that the analysis defini-
tively does assume incomplete information” (p. 19). Instead, theories
that assume full information would require that both curves shift at the
same time. Two consequences ensue. First, “the steady-state elasticities
view is seen to be misleading. What the response to a particular
impulse will then depend upon the state of information and not just on
steady-state behavioral parameters” (p. 14). Secondly, “It is also appar-
ent that IS-LM can be a cumbersome inappropriate framework for rep-
resenting theories that make non-standard assumptions about the
knowledge of transactors and, consequently, about the time-phasing of
events” (p. 19). Leijonhufvud, therefore, concluded: “So is the proced-
ure of shifting LM, keeping IS constant – or vice versa – justified? The
answer is: Sometimes, perhaps often, but not necessarily or always.
And that is very largely what is the matter with IS-LM” (p. 32).
Brunner and Leijonhufvud dismissed Keynesian economics for hav-
ing developed an approach in which the importance of relative prices
(and notably the ratio of P to p) is discarded. They stressed that this
approach (that even Friedman used on occasion) underrated the
effectiveness of monetary policy, since interest rates were considered
as borrowing costs displaying a limited impact on aggregate demand.
Brunner and Leijonhufvud thus rejected one of the main ingredients
of Keynesian economics, namely the IS-LM model. This model would
be intractable for analysing the consequence of shocks and would
have contributed to place the elasticity debate (which both of them
found irrelevant) at the heart of the “Monetarist controversy”.
4. Signal-extraction problems and the propagation of shocks
Signal-extraction (or inference) problems tackled by Brunner and
Leijonhufvud relate to the non-neutrality of money in the short run,
as well as the persistence of unemployment associated with
stagflation17.
17 The arguments developed in this section are close to those exposed in Section 2.2. I have,
however, chosen to treat them separately. Indeed, the object of Section 2.2 has been the direct
application (and the promotion) of Alchian’s theory of price inflexibility and unemployment
by Brunner and Leijonhufvud. This theory involves a particular type of signal-extraction
problems (between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks), essentially in the labour market.
Instead, the present section deals with alternative types of inference problems (notably
between permanent and transitory shocks) which do not necessarily occur in the labour
market. We may infer that these differences could explain why Brunner and Leijonhufvud did
not mention Alchian’s theory in this part of their work.
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4.1. Monetary shocks and the non-neutrality of money
For a long time, Brunner considered that fluctuations in real output
resulted mainly from exogenous variations in the growth of the mon-
etary base18. The explanation of the non-neutrality of money in the
short run is most clearly exposed in Brunner and Meltzer (1997)19. As
illustrated by Figure 1, they used a standard aggregate supply/aggre-
gate demand apparatus for which the aggregate-supply curve has a
positive slope and the aggregate-demand curve a negative slope in the
real output/price level plan. The position of the aggregate-supply
curve depends on nominal wages (the higher these wages, the higher
the position of the curve in the plan). There is also a vertical line
which represents the level of “normal” real output. Note that the term
“normal” refers to the Marshallian lexicon, an issue about which I will
turn below.
The analysis starts from “an initial position located on the normal
output line. An expansionary monetary policy action is undertaken to
raise output above the normal level. Initially, output and the price
level rise from point A to point B. Recognition of the permanence of
the change induces a corresponding adjustment in wage contracts,
pushing aggregate supply toward position C. The movement from B
to C is slow, if the expansionary policy action is interpreted as a tran-
sitory change and more rapid if the change is perceived to be perman-
ent. Recognition does not occur all at once and is not uniform for all






Figure 1. Short-run non-neutrality of money in Brunner and Meltzer (1997).
18 This “stylised” fact would have been well documented by Friedman and Schwartz (1963a).
19 The argumentation developed there was first described in Brunner, Cukierman, and
Meltzer (1983).
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particularly costs of negotiation, interacts with the recognition prob-
lem to delay full adjustment” (p. 129–130).
Hence, the real effects of permanent monetary shocks stem from
the failure by some agents (firms as well as workers) to initially recog-
nise20 the permanent dimension of monetary impulses: these agents
interpret such impulses as only transitory and rationally choose to
keep wages and then prices unchanged21. Brunner (1980) stressed that
this type of signal-extraction problem (between permanent and transi-
tory shocks) seems more relevant than the one (between local and
global shocks) put forward by Lucas in his “island” models, notably
since this latter type would not explain “the lamented unresponsive-
ness of prices to current conditions” (p. 417). Moreover, the capacity
of monetary policy to enhance real activity will be reduced with fur-
ther monetary expansions since “At some point, market participants
recognize that the effects on output are temporary, while the effects
on prices are permanent. Wages and costs adjust more rapidly and
the aggregate supply curve moves faster; the upward shift accelerates”
(Brunner and Meltzer (1997, 131)).
Throughout most of his work, Leijonhufvud saw the fluctuations in
real variables as mainly stemming from real disturbances, especially
the exogenous changes in the Marginal Efficiency of Capital (hence-
forth “MEC”) advocated by Keynes. Nevertheless, he later acknowl-
edged the importance of monetary impulses. In Leijonhufvud (1986),
he claimed: “My inference is that real impulses (with endogenous
money) predominated until the mid-1960s and that while real
impulses are still intermingled later, nominal ones predominate”
(p. 414, brackets in original). Now, to the best of my knowledge, he
did not provide a complete account of the way monetary shocks gen-
erate fluctuations in real variables.
However, he gave some interesting insights into Leijonhufvud
(1981b). On the one hand, if solely monetary shocks occurred, a mon-
etary expansion would induce economic agents to raise prices propor-
tionally. On the other hand, if solely real shocks happened, an
exogenous increase in the MEC would entail an endogenous increase
20 Brunner and Meltzer spoke about a “recognition lag” (p. 144). As we shall see later, the
assumption that agents fail to distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks was
introduced by Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980).
21 In this case, indeed, the expected gains of adjusting wages are lower than the costs incurred
to renegotiate them. Wages are kept unchanged and so are prices, which are set by firms that
apply a constant markup over marginal costs.
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in credit and then in monetary aggregates, but prices would not be
raised in proportion. When both types of disturbances can be pre-
sent and may further interact, “transactors will have a difficult time
sorting nominal from real shocks” (p. 22) so that monetary
impulses can have real effects. Indeed, “When the base is seen to
expand, is it an extension of ‘real credit’ by the Central Bank? Or
is it a nominal scaling-up of all values in the system, so that one’s
prices should be marked up proportionally? Uncertainty on this
score could produce stickiness of nominal prices in the face of
monetary expansion” and therefore, fluctuations in real output.
This inference problem would provide “a more plausible reason for
short-run non-neutrality of money than does the ‘islands’ story”. In
addition, “As the economy learned to adapt, finally, to the inces-
sant discretionary manipulation of a fiat money totally without an
anchor, the lags in response of prices and nominal short-term rates
shortened” (p. 14).
In order to explain the short-run non-neutrality of money (and the
associated rigidity of prices), Brunner and Leijonhufvud stressed the
prominent role of signal-extraction problems. Brunner emphasised
inference problems between permanent and transitory monetary
shocks, while Leijonhufvud invoked inference problems between mon-
etary and real shocks. They further pointed out that the repetitive use
of unexpected monetary impulses by central banks induces agents to
recognise such impulses more rapidly. This would imply an
‘acceleration’ of wage and price adjustments, hence reducing the dur-
ation of real effects.
4.2. Real shocks and persistent unemployment
In the 1980s, as evidence accumulated, Brunner (1983, 29) tempered
his former position about the dominance of monetary shocks in real-
output fluctuations. He argued that “The movement of output, mean-
while, reflects an interaction of monetary and real shocks”. The first
manifestation of this change can be found in Brunner, Cukierman,
and Meltzer (1980), where the high and persistent unemployment
associated with the stagflation that occurred from the mid 1970s
would be the result of permanent negative shocks on labour
productivity.
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In their framework, there is “speculation of labor over time as in
Lucas and Rapping (1969)” (p. 469, fn.5): the supply of labour is a
positive function of the gap between the current real wage and the
real wage perceived as permanent (or ‘normal’). If workers could dis-
tinguish between the permanent and transitory components of prod-
uctivity, they would immediately reduce their estimation of the
permanent wage in response to a permanent decline in productivity.
The current wage and the perceived permanent one would fall com-
mensurately so that workers would not modify their labour supply.
However, economic agents can actually observe only productivity as a
whole: they are unable to distinguish between its permanent and tran-
sitory components. Some workers wrongly interpret a permanent
decline in productivity as a transitory one and thus do not immedi-
ately reduce their estimate of the permanent wage. The current wage
is, therefore, lower than the perceived permanent wage, which induces
these workers to substitute current for future leisure and then to
become ‘unemployed’.
Moreover, unemployment can persist well after the shock has
occurred. Indeed, workers stay unemployed as long as their estimation
of the permanent wage is not fully adjusted to the new permanent
component of productivity. The elasticity of expectations depends on
the relative frequency of permanent and transitory shocks. When
“people are unaccustomed to permanent shocks, they take longer to
believe that the productivity shock is permanent after it occurs”
(p. 489). In this case, expectations are relatively inelastic and
unemployment is persistent: “Infrequent permanent shocks lengthen
the period of stagflation”.
Another important corollary of the inability to distinguish per-
manent from transitory shocks is the emergence of wage ‘stickiness’
(p. 481). Indeed, “When people believe that the permanent level of
productivity is higher than the actual level, they refuse offers of
employment at wages below the wage they believe should prevail”
(p. 483–484). This limits the downward adjustment of current
wages: “Real wages decline on impact but do not fully respond to
the shock until the permanence of the shock is recognized”
(p. 490).
I have mentioned above that Leijonhufvud (1980a) (in most of his
writings) took for granted that exogenous changes in the MEC were
the main impulses of real-output and unemployment fluctuations.
20 P. CLERC
In “Theories of stagflation”, he also explained the persistent
unemployment that characterised this phenomenon by permanent
negative shocks on the MEC22.
In this paper, as in many others, Leijonhufvud assumed that the
demand for money of investors on the financial markets takes the
‘speculative’ form considered by Keynes: money demand is a negative
function of the gap between the market interest rate and the interest
rate perceived as ‘normal’. Suppose that, whenever a permanent
decline in the MEC occurs, “all agents perceive correctly what has
happened” (p. 7–8). Investors should immediately reduce their estima-
tion of the normal rate. The market and perceived normal rates
should fall commensurately so that investors should not modify their
demand for money. For a given money supply, there should be no
excess demand for money and aggregate demand should, therefore,
stay at its full-employment level. However, “all agents will not in gen-
eral correctly assess what is happening” (p. 8). Investors are assumed
to have a less accurate perception of the MEC than entrepreneurs23.
In addition, Leijonhufvud (1983, 22) recalled that “historically, the
average real rate of return has not been a volatile variable”. This indu-
ces investors to form expectations which are inelastic. Consequently,
they do not immediately reduce their estimation of the normal rate
when a permanent decline in the MEC occurs. The market rate is
thus lower than the perceived normal rate, which implies an increase
in their money demand. For a given money supply, the resulting
excess demand for money generates a fall in aggregate demand, which
stands below its full-employment level until investors completely
revise their beliefs.
Hence, the fall in aggregate demand is explained by the failure of
investors to recognise the permanent dimension of the decrease in the
MEC. In other words: “What the theory says (roughly) is that it is
only the unanticipated or, better, unrecognized part of this real dis-
turbance that has an effect on aggregate real income and employment”
(Leijonhufvud (1981a, 198–199), brackets and italics in original).
Moreover, workers are assumed to lack information about wage rates
22 These shocks, and the related theory, would “explain the persistently disappointing
performance by the American economy in this period (1965–1980)’’ (p. 26, brackets added)).
23 As a result, there are “inconsistent beliefs of firms and security market investors about the
realizable rate of real profit in the economy’’ (p. 9).
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in other jobs24. In order to determine their reservation wages, they
take past wages as references. They thus form inelastic expectations,
which prevents reservation wages from being immediately adjusted to
the lower demand for labour. As a result, the workers to whom lower
wage proposals are made refuse them: “We may suppose that the one
thing workers will not do is to auction off their services for the day at
whatever wage employers will pay in total disregard of their own
beliefs about the equilibrium rate is” (Leijonhufvud (1980a, 9)). Two
consequences ensue. First, these workers become (‘speculatively’)
unemployed so as to search for better wage offers elsewhere. Second,
rejection of lower wages produces wage stickiness. Nevertheless,
Leijonhufvud was anxious to warn the reader that even if workers
finally accepted lower wages, it would not cure unemployment: “large-
scale unemployment persists and even the willingness of labor to
reduce the money wage will not help” (Leijonhufvud (1981a, 167)).
The ultimate cause of unemployment is to be found in the financial
market, rendering any adjustments in the labour market futile: “With
the interest rate at the right level, market forces should make
unemployment converge on its ‘natural’ rate – but otherwise not”
(p.169, italics in original).
Leijonhufvud (1973) further pointed out that the persistence of
unemployment increases in the case of large disturbances. He first
raised that real-world economies are stock-flow economies, in which
agents accumulate important amounts of liquid assets (or cash balan-
ces) so as to maintain the level of consumption when current receipts
decline. Hence, when a relatively small decline in the MEC takes
place, the resulting unemployed workers hardly reduce expenditures
by drawing in their liquid assets25. In this case, the economy stays
within the corridor: deviation-amplifying forces are weaker than devi-
ation-counteracting ones, such that the economy reverts back to full
employment whenever investors’ beliefs are adjusted26. On the other
hand, when an unexpectedly large fall in the MEC happens, the buffer
stock of cash balances will be quickly exhausted and unemployed
24 “This story does not give both sides of the labor market the same information sets’’
(Leijonhufvud (1983, p. 28)).
25 Moreover, if consumption is driven by wealth (like for permanent-income or life-cycle
theories), small shocks will not impair this latter and consumption will not be altered at all if
cash balances are enough.
26 “Second thoughts on effective demand theory suggest that the capabilities self-regulating
behavior of actual market systems are likely to be a good more ‘robust’ ’’ (p. 34).
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workers will have to sharply reduce their expenditures. Here, the
economy is pushed outside the corridor: deviation-amplifying forces
are stronger than deviation-counteracting ones, which involves highly
persistent involuntary unemployment.
In summary, Brunner (from the 1980s) and Leijonhufvud (through-
out his work) attributed the emergence and the persistence of
unemployment to permanent negative shocks on productivity. Again,
signal-extraction problems play a crucial role in the transmission of
these disturbances. Unemployment emerges since some agents fail to
immediately recognise the permanent dimension of the decline in
productivity and then adopt speculative behavior. These agents revise
their beliefs only gradually and unemployment persists as long as
beliefs are not fully adjusted. This process takes more time (expecta-
tions are all the more inelastic) as permanent shocks occur infre-
quently. Leijonhufvud stressed that unemployment can persist over a
longer period of time (turning to involuntary unemployment) in case
of large shocks. For both authors, wage rigidities also arise endogen-
ously as a result of inference problems. However, in spite of these
similarities, Brunner and Leijonhufvud parted company on a key
point: while Brunner’s story essentially emphasises maladjustments
concerning wages, Leijonhufvud’s explanation relies primarily on mal-
adjustments concerning interest rates.
5. The Marshall–Walras divide
5.1. A Marshallian approach of the whole economy
Leijonhufvud defined the Marshallian tradition as comprising five
characteristics. Section 5.1.1 illustrates that the work of Brunner and
Leijonhufvud is consistent with four of these characteristics. The last
one, namely the state-of-rest conception of equilibrium, requires more
investigation. This is the object of Section 5.1.2. Finally, Section 5.1.3
points out that Brunner and Leijonhufvud departed from most
Marshallian economists by adopting a general-equilibrium perspective.
5.1.1. Leijonhufvud’s definition of the Marshallian tradition
In many writings, Leijonhufvud distinguished two traditions in neo-
classical economics, which he termed “Classical and “Modern” in
Leijonhufvud (1998). In the same article, as well as in Leijonhufvud
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(2006), he associated the Classical tradition with the name of
Marshall27. The aim of the theory underlying this tradition would be
the study of “the laws of motion of the system” (Leijonhufvud (1998,
171)). It would have five characteristics: (a) the motivation of eco-
nomic agents is the maximisation of utility (or profit), but it is only
“an assumption about motivation, not realization. Transactors are
thought of as striving to ‘climb utility mountain’, not as lolling forever
on their peaks” (p. 170); (b) their behaviour is “adaptive (often gradi-
ent climbing)” (p. 171); (c) their “cognitive competence” can be char-
acterised as “bounded rationality”, agents being “capable of learning”;
(d) the role of institutions is “essential in guiding behaviour, making
the behaviour of others predictable”; (e) equilibrium is conceived as a
“state of rest”: “the Marshallian equilibrium concepts are defined by
the constancy of some observable (realized) variable” (p. 176, brackets
and italics in original)28.
Leijonhufvud’s own work undoubtedly belongs to this tradition. We
have seen in Section 2.1 that his endorsement of Alchian’s evolution-
ary perspective led him to adopt characteristics (a) and (b). The third
one is advocated on many occasions, and especially in Leijonhufvud
(1993) when it is argued that “the typical agent copes with an incred-
ibly complex environment armed with only ‘bounded rationality’
“(p. 6). What decision-makers learn depends on the nature of prevail-
ing institutions and market organisations. Their interaction in the
marketplace is crucial for the information it brings to them.
Moreover, money stands out prominently among institutions, not
only as a medium of exchange but also as a store of value.
Leijonhufvud (1977), particularly stressed that money should be
treated as an institution, for in all its aspects each person’s choices
about how much to use, hold, etc… depend critically upon
conventions.
To the best of my knowledge, Brunner never explicitly claimed to
be a Marshallian. It is nonetheless possible to find in his writings
some evidence that he clearly inclined towards the Marshallian trad-
ition, however, defined. For example, Brunner (1989) characterised
Monetarism as a “‘classical’ programme of a non-Walrasian tradition”
(p. 197) and recalled that “the idea of a normal output is inherent in
27 As we shall see in Section 5.2, the Modern tradition is the Walrasian one.
28 In the words of Leijonhufvud (2006, 59): “‘Equilibrium’ was understood as a state in which
the pertinent ‘law of motion’ had ceased to operate’’.
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the classical tradition” (p. 221). I have already mentioned that the
modifier “normal” refers to the Marshallian lexicon. Moreover,
Brunner (1987b) praised Keynes for “His ‘Marshallian analysis’
(which), in contrast to a ‘Walrasian approach’, emphasized the
importance of felicitous simplication in the best tradition of economi-
cs” (p. 49, brackets added).
Brunner’s work also fits well with Leijonhufvud’s classification of
the Marshallian tradition. The main attributions of his “Resourceful,
Evaluating, Maximizing Man” (described in Section 2.1) fall within
the first two characteristics laid down by Leijonhufvud. Similarly,
Brunner raising that “The issues addressed under the term ‘bounded
rationality’ are… quite relevant for our purposes” (1987a, 378) obvi-
ously relates to the third one. The REMM evolves in an environment
for which “the interaction among individuals is, of course, not limited
to the marketplace, but extends to a wide variety of organizational
structure” (Brunner and Meckling (1977, 77)). All this “offers a new
vision and a new understanding of social institutions” (Brunner
(1987a, 368)). This is particularly the case for money, whose existence
results from the willingness to reduce uncertainty and information
costs (Brunner (1971); Brunner and Meltzer (1971))29.
5.1.2. A state-of-rest conception of equilibrium
The state-of-rest conception of equilibrium is also a key feature of the
Marshallian tradition for De Vroey (2000). According to this article,
two equilibrium concepts coexist in book V of Marshall’s Principles,
namely market equilibrium and normal equilibrium. Market equilib-
rium, which occurs in each trade round, is defined by the matching
of market supply and demand, the quantity produced being given.
Normal equilibrium is defined by the matching of normal supply and
demand, for which agents30 have no longer any incentive to change
their behavior. Moreover, market-equilibrium values gravitate around
normal-equilibrium values. Movements observed in prices and/or
quantities thus represent the convergence process of market values
toward normal ones. When this process is achieved, a situation of full
equilibrium (in short, “equilibrium”) is said to prevail and the market
29 It is interesting to note that Alchian (1977, 133) located the origins of Brunner’s monetary
thought in their “long association’’ and in “some ancient joint discussions’’.
30 Essentially firms in Marshall’s theory.
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comes to a standstill. In turn, “disequilibrium” prevails whenever nor-
mal equilibrium is not fulfilled, i.e., whenever market values differ
from normal values. Importantly, it takes time for a new normal equi-
librium position to be attained after a shock has disturbed an earlier
one. Consequently, “the economy is generally out of equilibrium” (De
Vroey (2016, 182)).
The state-of-rest conception of equilibrium stands in sharp contrast
with the one advocated by neo-Walrasian economists. These authors
put forward a single equilibrium concept, namely intertemporal equi-
librium, for which all adjustments take place instantaneously after a
shock: in each point of time, markets clear while all agents “follow an
optimizing consumption/leisure intertemporal path” (De Vroey (2016,
184)), such that disequilibrium situations are impossible31.
Brunner retained the state-of-rest conception of equilibrium to deal
with the short-run non-neutrality of money and the resulting fluctua-
tions of output. We have seen that the analysis starts at some normal
equilibrium position. A permanent monetary expansion is assumed to
occur. The new normal equilibrium position is characterised by a
higher price level, while the output is unchanged. However, agents
(firms as well as workers) are unable to distinguish between perman-
ent and transitory changes. A monetary expansion is thus perceived
as only transitory by some of them: there are “heterogeneous beliefs
among people about the actual situation” (Brunner and Meltzer (1997,
41)). The agents who interpret the monetary impulse as transitory do
not immediately revise their expectations of the future price level.
This implies that actual wages and prices are not all adjusted to their
new normal values: “Some people perceive a change as permanent,
some as transitory. Some are correct, some are wrong. These errors
are unavoidable… (and) delay the full response of all prices” (p. 100,
brackets added). Therefore, output moves and gravitates around its
unchanged normal value32. Gradually, the agents who initially failed
to recognise the permanent dimension of the monetary expansion
revise their beliefs. The convergence process towards the new normal
equilibrium lasts until all agents revise their expectations and then
adjust all wages and prices.
31 Models based on the intertemporal equilibrium concept comprise intertemporal substitution
on top of intra-period substitution, while reasoning in terms of the state-of-rest equilibrium
exclusively involves intra-period substitution.
32 There is “Motion of the equilibrium point around the normal output line’’ (p. 131).
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Leijonhufvud adopted the state-of-rest conception of equilibrium in
his explanation of output fluctuations. Starting from a normal equilib-
rium position at full employment, a permanent decline in the MEC is
assumed to occur. The new normal equilibrium position is character-
ised by a lower normal (or natural) interest rate which induces offset-
ting variations in investment and consumption expenditures, leaving
output unaffected. However, given that the average real rate of return
was historically a relatively stable variable, investors on the financial
markets fail to recognise the permanent decline in the MEC.
Therefore, they do not immediately revise their beliefs about the nor-
mal rate. Investors and entrepreneurs thus form “inconsistent beliefs”
about the value of this rate: “agents are acting on inconsistent beliefs.
Such states will be called disequilibria” (Leijonhufvud (1981a, 140),
italics in original). This entails that the interest rate on the stock
exchange is not fully adjusted to its new normal value. Investment
falls more than consumption rises. Output and then labour demand
decrease. Gradually, investors revise their beliefs about the normal
rate33. The convergence process towards the new normal equilibrium
lasts until investors completely revise their expectations and the mar-
ket rate equates its new normal level. This process can last much lon-
ger if the decline in the MEC is large and involuntary
unemployment ensues.
Brunner and Leijonhufvud both conceived equilibrium as a state of
rest, notably in their explanation of output fluctuations.
“Heterogeneous” or “inconsistent” beliefs imply that the economic
system fails to immediately adjust from one normal equilibrium pos-
ition to the other in response to permanent changes. The convergence
process lasts until all agents revise their beliefs and the speed of
adjustment is positively related to the frequency of permanent
disturbances.
5.1.3. A general-equilibrium perspective
De Vroey (2004) recalled that “The standard view about the
Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches… is that they are com-
plementary… with Marshallian theory focusing on the study of
33 “Why should not (the market rate) simply come down to (the new normal rate) as
speculators learn that no better placements are opening up? It will’’ (Leijonhufvud (1981a,
199), brackets added).
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isolated parts of the economy and Walrasian theory on the study of
the economy as a whole. The latter then appears to be the generaliza-
tion of the former” (p. 63). De Vroey, instead, dissented from this
view and brought out that “there is room for a Marshallian general
equilibrium approach distinct from the Walrasian” (p. 64). We have
previously shown that Brunner and Leijonhufvud belonged to the
Marshallian tradition (defined along the lines of Leijonhufvud). We
now argue that they held a general-equilibrium perspective.
The adoption by Brunner of such perspective can be illustrated by
the model he built with Meltzer to formalise the monetarist transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy. This model encompasses a
money market, a credit market and an output market (sometimes
supplemented with a labour market). Once all adjustments have been
realised (in response to a monetary impulse) “the system reaches a
new general equilibrium with all asset markets and the output market
at a consistent equilibrium” (Meltzer (1995, 58)). Brunner (1971)
emphasised that this framework provides a “complete analysis which
elaborates the full interaction of output market, credit market and
‘money market’” (59, italics added), a highly desirable feature in his
eyes. For him, the impact of changes in prices and quantities in one
market on the prices and quantities in all other markets should be
systematically examined. Brunner notably blamed James Tobin and
the so-called “Credit View” on these grounds: “the Credit View
derives from a partial and incomplete analysis of the interaction
between the crucial relations describing an economy’s functioning”
(59, italics in original), explained by “Yale’s usual disregard of the
interaction between output and asset markets expressed by the
assumption that output prices are constant” (35).
The strong emphasis laid by Brunner on the full interaction
between markets sharply differs from the approach of another
Marshallian, namely Friedman34. According to this latter, “The dis-
tinction commonly drawn between Marshall and Walras is that
Marshall dealt with ‘partial equilibrium’, Walras with ‘general equilib-
rium’. This distinction is, I believe, false and unimportant. Marshall
and Walras alike dealt with general equilibrium” (1949, 490)35.
However, Friedman will not embrace a general-equilibrium
34 Contrary to Brunner, Friedman is a professed Marshallian. He claimed his adhesion to the
Marshallian tradition on many occasions (e.g. in Friedman (1972)).
35 As mentioned above, this will also be the position of De Vroey (2004).
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perspective to cope with the “interdependence problem”. Indeed,
“Friedman recognizes interdependence, but insists that, for practical
purposes, problems must be partitioned into parts analyzed in detail
and parts summarized” (Hoover (1984, 74))36. The systematic consid-
eration of all interactions is instead what he conceived as the hallmark
of a “Walrasian viewpoint”, for which “abstractness, generality, and
mathematical elegance have in some measure become ends in
themselves” (Friedman (1949, 490))37.
Leijonhufvud stressed, as early as 1968, that the interaction between
all markets should be at the heart of “a relevant theory of a monetary
economy”: “In order to come to grips with this problem, however, we
must relinquish the present single-market framework and deal with a
system of several interrelated markets” (p. 80). Considering the econ-
omy as a whole would be especially required to explain the cumulative
process leading to involuntary unemployment: “The assumed devi-
ation-amplifying feedbacks involved in this process cannot be explained
in terms of an isolated labor-market model – the entire money-using
system must be considered” (p. 81, italics in original).
A few years later, in 1973, Leijonhufvud built the concept of
“effective demand failures”. I have mentioned in the introduction of
the present article that these failures are of two types: “The first con-
cerns the saving-investment nexus. Increased savings (reduced con-
sumption) leads to an excess supply of consumer goods in the present
but does so without signalling an excess demand for consumption in
the future… The second type of effective demand failure is at the root
of the Keynesian multiplier. Unemployed workers attempt to sell their
36 More precisely: “For Friedman, Cournot’s problem is, given economic interdependence, how
to cope with economic analysis using practical methods… Marshall’s method is a response to
Cournot’s problem. It attempts to keep an investigation manageable by examining one
problem at a time… For the point of the Cournot problem and Marshall’s (and Friedman’s)
solution to it is that, whatever the economic problem, any practically significant analysis of it
requires that reality be partitioned. The most important bits with respect to the problem at
hand are analyzed in detail; the rest are summarized in less detail (but not forgotten, of
course)’’ (Hoover (1984, 65–66, brackets and italics in original)).
37 An example can illustrate this divergence between Brunner and Friedman. Friedman (1971)
assumed a constant real interest rate in his preferred way of closing his “Theoretical
Framework”. Brunner criticised this choice as follows: “By keeping real rates constant…
Friedman’s ‘common model’ neglects the variables that, we believe, explain many of the
short-run changes in expenditure’’ (Brunner and Meltzer (1972b, p.847)). Friedman justified
this assumption by invoking a “Marshallian approach’’ of economic theory: “From a
Marshallian approach… there is nothing inconsistent or wrong about using a theory that
treats the real interest rate as constant in analyzing fluctuations in nominal income but using
a theory that treats the real interest rate as variable in analyzing fluctuations in real income;
the one theory may be more useful for the one purpose, the other theory for the other. We
lose generality by this procedure but gain simplicity and precision’’ (1972, 920, italics added).
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labour in order to buy consumer goods. In so doing, they exert an
excess supply in the labour market, but their corresponding excess
demand for consumption goods is ineffective when not backed by
ready purchasing power” (Leijonhufvud (2006, 66, brackets in ori-
ginal)). Again, the interaction between markets is critical in the emer-
gence of states with involuntary unemployment: “The combination of
the two effective demand failures is crucial. Neither one will by itself
send the system into an unemployment equilibrium… The trouble
arises when the two effective demand failures interact. When saving
exceeds investment at full employment real income, output and
employment will fall. This in turn will reduce consumption – the devi-
ation from full employment is amplified through the consumption –
“multiplier”. The contraction will proceed until the decline in incomes
reduces saving to equality with investment” (67, italics in original).
Hence, Brunner and Leijonhufvud adopted a general-equilibrium
perspective. The interaction between markets would be a key feature,
in the transmission of monetary policy (Brunner) as well as in the
explanation of involuntary unemployment (Leijonhufvud). This con-
trasts with the position of other Marshallians who, like Friedman,
dealt differently with the interdependence problem. In a nutshell,
Brunner and Leijonhufvud developed some kind of “Marshallian gen-
eral equilibrium approach”.38
5.2. The criticism of Walrasian economics
Walrasian economics was labeled as the “Modern” tradition by
Leijonhufvud (1998). This tradition would focus on “the logical prin-
ciples of efficient allocation” (170), with five characteristics: (a’) “the
statement that (agents) maximize utility or profit is taken to be a
proposition about realized performance, not just intention or
ambition” (171, brackets added); (b’) the behaviour of agents is
“optimizing ex ante” (italics in original); (c’) agents have “unbounded
rationality”, so that “they know all that they can know and need
know in order to deduce all utility-relevant consequences of alterna-
tive courses of action”; (d’) “institutions become problematic rather
than essential. What are they doing there? Why do people use money?
The answers are lamentably unpersuasive”; (e’) the equilibrium
38 That Leijonhufvud had tried to develop such an approach was already noted by De Vroey
(2004, p.78 and 2016, p.116).
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concept is one of “mutual consistency of all plans”, i.e., intertemporal
equilibrium.
Leijonhufvud (1968) was already skeptical about the ability of
Walrasian economics to grant a special role to money: “Much of the
modern monetary theory deals with money as just one of the n goods
in a general equilibrium model… Money has no special status, and
in a model which deals only with situations characterized by exchange
equilibrium, money is (at most) ‘just another good’” (79, brackets and
italics in original). Instead, “In a money exchange system, the means
of payment is ‘a good traded in all markets’. Herein, it is different
from all other goods. The aesthetic attractions of modern general
equilibrium models should not make us forget this fact” (80). He fur-
ther pointed out that money “cannot be ‘important’ in theories which
devote attention only to equilibrium situations” (80, fn.26) and “can
be added to such models only by artifice” (Leijonhufvud (1967, 403)).
Leijonhufvud was also critical about the relevance of the intertem-
poral equilibrium concept. For instance, he raised that “intertemporal
optimization constantly forces the economist to make information
assumptions which are unreasonable” (Leijonhufvud (1998, 182)) and
“the natural rate of unemployment doctrine is founded on the implicit
assumption that we are dealing with a system that is always in inter-
temporal equilibrium… Certainly, the instability of Phillips curves
does not by itself lend any support to this daring notion” (185, brack-
ets in original). Leijonhufvud (2006) also complained that, in the
Walrasian tradition, “ ‘Equilibrium’ is, however, a rather otiose term,
since if no observed behaviour may be interpreted as a failure to opti-
mize, ‘disequilibria’ are not possible” (60).
For Leijonhufvud (1989), “New Classical economics… adds a cou-
ple of ‘lemmas’ to the rational behavior postulate, namely (i) that the
rational agent… will know the structure of the economy… and (ii)
that rational agents will not leave any gains from trade unexploited”
(11–12). “Now, it was supposed that the first of these lemmas more
or less does away with discrepancies between the subjectively per-
ceived and the objectively existing reality and also, therefore, between
the expectations of different agents”. Thus, Leijonhufvud’s “emphasis
on inconsistent beliefs is foreign to Rational Expectations theory”
(Leijonhufvud (1981a, 199), fn.109).
The immediate and complete adjustment of prices naturally ensues:
“If all agents in a market receive the same news and evaluate it using
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the same theory, they will all agree on what change in price is
indicated” (Leijonhufvud (1981b, 24)). This adjustment of prices not-
ably applies to the interest rate in response to a real shock, both when
agents act on “mutually consistent beliefs and these beliefs are
correct” (26) and when they act on “Mutually consistent beliefs again,
but we allow for the possibility that what everyone believes will still
be wrong”, the latter case amounting to “a real counterpart to Lucas’
monetarist equilibrium cycle model” (28). In addition, “The argument
that the agents will act so as to exhaust apparent gains from trade
that the New Classicists have used against fix-price modellers is sim-
ply irrelevant in the intertemporal context chosen here… With
incomplete intertemporal markets the interactions required to gener-
ate information about, and exploit, these potential gains from trade
do not take place” (29, fn.32).
Recall that Brunner (1989) defined Monetarism as a “‘classical’ pro-
gramme of a non-Walrasian tradition”. This explicit rejection of
Walrasian economics is particularly related to its inability to account
for the emergence of many institutions, and especially money: “The
Walrasian paradigm, based on the absence of information and trans-
action costs, necessarily omits all social phenomena conditioned by
the operation of such costs. With full information and in the absence
of any transaction costs there is no reason for the occurrence of
money, on financial intermediaries and no rationale for many other
social institutions… Any positive valued item functions potentially as
a medium of exchange. There is no reason for the concentrated and
systematic selection of objects to function as an accepted medium of
exchange used with dominant regularity. Important problems of our
monetary and financial reality remain inaccessible to such a
Walrasian tradition” (199). In a nutshell: “A Walrasian world has no
role for money, financial intermediaries, business firms, or contractual
arrangements” (Brunner and Meltzer (1997, 65–66)).
Among neo-Walrasian economists, Brunner focused criticism on
the authors of the New Classical Macroeconomics. He first criticised
them for their adherence to the intertemporal concept of equilibrium:
“I also have strong reservations about crucial aspects of their
‘equilibrium approach’” (Klamer (1984), 191). To the question “So
what is wrong with new classical economics?”, Brunner answered:
“Their interpretation of equilibrium analysis seems dubious to me.
This specific kind of equilibrium analysis implies that all prices are
32 P. CLERC
market-clearing relative to all shock-realizations. Prices reflect all
ongoing shocks irrespective of their duration, irrespective of whether
agents perceive shocks to be quite transitory or very permanent” (192,
italics in original).
Brunner and Meltzer (1997) stressed that the models of the New
Classical Macroeconomics rely on what they called the “strong form
of rational expectations”: “expectations are formed in a way that
makes the subjective probabilities used to form expectations the same
as the true probability distribution of the events to be forecast”, since
agents are assumed to have “detailed knowledge about the structure
of the economy” (38). Hence, “Anticipations are drawn from a known
distribution” (64), so that beliefs cannot be heterogeneous. The
instantaneous adjustment in response to shocks is closely related to
the strong form of rational expectations: “rational expectations ana-
lysis implies that inertial processes and other response patterns are
‘immediately’ adjusted to new conditions. This follows from the
assumptions of… homogenous decision makers with subjective prob-
ability distributions that match the true probability distribu-
tions” (132).
A main feature of the New Classical Macroeconomics is the absence
of price stickiness. This is the case for later models (notably those of
the Real Business Cycle approach), in which agents have complete
information, as well as for the first ‘island’ models developed along
the lines of Lucas, in which agents have the same imperfect informa-
tion about the realisation of shocks (64–65). Furthermore,
“Representatives of the new classical macroeconomics argue that
exploitation of all mutually advantageous trades implies the occur-
rence of fully flexible prices” (133). To explain price inflexibility, “We
must move beyond the Walrasian tradition, however, and recognize
the relevance of information and transaction costs”.
Brunner and Leijonhufvud raised criticism to Walrasian economics
for its incapacity to explain the existence of many institutions, espe-
cially money. They particularly criticised the authors of the New
Classical Macroeconomics for adopting the Walrasian intertemporal
equilibrium concept. They also questioned their assumption that
agents know the structure of the economy (meaning that the subject-
ive and objective probability distributions match) so that agents form
identical beliefs. These features entail that all prices are adjusted in
response to shocks. The full and instantaneous adjustment of prices
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would occur when agents have perfect information, as well as when
they have the same imperfect information about shock realisations.
Brunner and Leijonhufvud further rejected the proposition that the
exploitation by rational agents of all mutually advantageous gains
from trade would be inconsistent with price inflexibility.
6. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that Karl Brunner and Axel Leijonhufvud,
in spite of strong oppositions related to their rival schools of thought,
developed convergent positions on many theoretical and methodo-
logical questions. These positions relate to the evolutionary perception
of the economic agent in society, the theory of price inflexibility and
“search” unemployment, the role of relative prices (notably in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy), the importance of sig-
nal-extraction problems in the propagation of (monetary as well as
real) shocks and the Marshall–Walras divide (the belonging to the
Marshallian tradition (and especially to its conception of equilibrium),
the adoption of a general-equilibrium perspective, the criticism of
Walrasian economics). I have also argued that these convergences rest
on the constant emphasis Brunner and Leijonhufvud laid on imperfect
information.
Before concluding this paper with some words about their posterity,
it is worth stressing that Brunner and Leijonhufvud developed their
arguments at very different levels, and through very different styles.
In many ways, their analyses differ in focus and in scope. This is so
even when they discussed the same problems along similar lines (not-
ably those of Alchian). In particular, the systemic width and depth of
Leijonhufvud’s approach to macroeconomics sharply contrast with
Brunner’s more limited and pragmatic stance39.
An illustration of this contrast can be found in their respective use
of formal models. Brunner devoted a large part of his writings to
building a “monetarist framework for aggregative analysis” (Brunner
and Meltzer (1972c)). This framework would serve not only to study
the transmission of monetary policy, but also to make macro analysis
in a broad sense. Moreover, Brunner also used formal models to deal
39 This aspect may render our “friends or foes” subtitle somewhat less accurate. Rather than
rivalry (“foes”) on the same plane of argumentation, there may thus be an issue of
incongruence in discourse.
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with the signal-extraction problems we have considered in Section 4.
Conversely, Leijonhufvud never wrote down any model. In
Leijonhufvud (1997), he carefully distinguished “theories” from
“models”: “I propose to conceive of economic ‘theories’ as sets of
beliefs about the economy and how it functions. They refer to the
‘real world’… ‘Models’ are formal but partial representations of theo-
ries. A model never encompasses the entire theory to which it refers”
(p. 193). And in his case, it is clear that the “the evolving sequence of
theories” which constituted his “research programme” could not be
easily encapsulated within single models. An interesting example on
this ground relates to the “corridor hypothesis” proposed by
Leijonhufvud (1973). Howitt (1978) suggested that, contrary to the
doubts expressed by Grossman (1974), it could be possible to deliver
a formal treatment of this hypothesis. However, he warned the reader
that providing such a treatment “may require the employment of a
variety of short-run stability concepts”, so that “The examples
below… must therefore be regarded as nothing more than a first
step” (269). Given the difficulty of the task, it is hardly surprising that
this first step had no follow-up.
Their influence was also very different. That of Leijonhufvud
mainly took place on the academic scene. There, Peter Howitt was
undoubtedly the leading “Leijonhufvudian”. His Keynesian Recovery
book was primarily dedicated to what he called the “coordination
problem” (1990, 2) . This problem would have two dimensions,
namely “equilibrium coordination” and “disequilibrium coordination”.
The former “is the achievement of a coherent collective outcome
when people are basing their individual decisions on mutually consist-
ent beliefs” while the latter “is the ability of the system to arrive
expeditiously at an equilibrium; to harmonize people’s beliefs” (2–3).
No need to recall that the term “consistent beliefs” is inherited from
Leijonhufvud. Howitt raised that Leijonhufvud opened a research
agenda which encompassed both aspects of the coordination problem.
He notably stressed that Peter Diamond was treading in
Leijonhuvfud’s footsteps to deal with the equilibrium coordination
aspect (p. 52). At the same time, the recent development of agent-
based computational economics also owes much to the impulsion
given by Leijonhufvud at UCLA in the early 1990s.
The impact of Brunner’s work on academic circles was instead
quite weak. To the best of my knowledge, nobody tried to follow up
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on his research agenda, and especially the attempt (with Meltzer) to
build a “monetarist framework”’. Yet, in his time Brunner appeared to
have more influence than Leijonhufvud. Indeed, he played an import-
ant institutional role in the economic profession, particularly through
the community-building forces of his Konstanz Seminars and
Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. In these meet-
ings, he brought academics, central bankers, and other policymakers
together. They were the place where young revolutionaries, such as
Lucas, Sargent, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, launched the ideas
that were to transform macroeconomics. Brunner was also at the ori-
gin of the Journal of Monetary Economics and the Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, which soon became leading journals in the field
of monetary theory.
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